



4. All states shall develop a UN Emergency Peace Service to protect civilians and respond to crises

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Article

Rapporteur: Dr. H. Peter Langille (hpl@globalcommonsecurity.org)

The objective of the proposed United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) is to develop a standing UN capacity that can respond rapidly and reliably to address four of the UN's long-standing challenges. A UNEPS is designed to help prevent armed conflict and genocide/atrocity crimes; to protect civilians at risk; to ensure prompt start-up of demanding peace operations; and to address human needs in areas where others either cannot or will not.

In addition to the four primary roles identified, a UNEPS has emancipatory potential to help in the following areas: facilitating disarmament; freeing up enormous resources wasted on war; saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war; and as a step toward a more legitimate, effective, universal peace system.

A key lesson of previous experience is that favorable conditions for such a development tend to arise in the aftermath of tragic wars and genocides. Then, when the urgent need was evident, the prior preparation of a viable plan and a core constituency of support was not. This effort endeavors to ensure both are ready and sufficiently compelling to encourage development of a UNEPS before emergencies overwhelm.

A UNEPS will be a new UN formation. Thus, the UNEPS initiative is both a proposal and an advocacy campaign, coupled to an ongoing research project. Each aspect is a work in progress. To succeed, each aspect needs wider support.

Ten Core Principles of the proposed UNEPS:

1. a permanent standing, integrated UN formation;
2. highly trained and well-equipped;
3. ready for immediate deployment upon authorization of the UN Security Council;
4. multidimensional (civilians, police and military);
5. multifunctional (capable of diverse assignments with specialized skills for security, humanitarian, health and environmental crises);
6. composed of 13,500 dedicated personnel (recruited professionals who volunteer for service and are then screened, selected, trained and employed by the UN);
7. developed to ensure regional and gender equitable representation;
8. co-located at a designated UN base under an operational headquarters and two mobile mission headquarters;
9. at sufficient strength to operate in high-threat environments; and,
10. a service to complement existing UN and regional arrangements, with a first responder to cover the initial six months until Member States can deploy.(1)

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What's Different?

A UNEPS would be a standing UN formation, ready to serve in diverse UN operations, immediately available upon authorization of the UN Security Council. With dedicated UN personnel, advanced doctrine, training and equipment, UN operations could get off to a good start quickly at the outset of a crisis.

As a multidimensional service, a UNEPS will include sufficient police to restore law and order, a military formation to deter aggression and maintain security, as well civilian teams to provide essential services for conflict resolution, human rights, health, disaster assistance and peacebuilding quick impact projects.

A multifunctional service ensures a cost-effective capacity to help with a wider array of task. With its modular formation, responses can be tailored for specific operational requirements.

A UNEPS is to be a first-in, first-out service, limited to deployments of six months. With a prompt, coherent start-up, it is to de-escalate and calm the crisis, averting the need for more or, if required, lay a solid foundation for follow-on efforts.

As a 'UN 911' first responder for complex emergencies, a UNEPS is not intended for war-fighting, but primarily to provide prompt, reliable help. Yet it may also serve as a vanguard, a strategic reserve, a robust protector and a security guarantor, both to deter violent crime and respond, when necessary, to prevent and protect.

Another distinct feature of a UNEPS is that it would be composed of devoted individuals recruited worldwide within a UN rather than national service. After screening and selection on the basis of merit, skill and commitment, its personnel would be co-located on a UNEPS base where they would be extensively trained, equipped and employed by the UN. Thus, a UNEPS is a new model.

Unlike previous proposals, a UNEPS is to complement existing UN arrangements, with a service that's gender-equitable, which should help to develop higher standards system-wide. Aside from being a more rapid and reliable life-saver, this option is also a cost-saver.

The case for a UNEPS

From Rwanda and Srebrenica to Myanmar and Syria, the pattern of 'too little, too late' – incurring vast suffering, higher costs and wider consequences – has simply gone on for far too long. Instead of UN rapid deployment to prevent worse, routine delays allow worse.

People world-wide share a problem. According to research from the Institute for Economics and Peace, "the world is less peaceful today than at any time in the past decade".(2) "After declining for much of the 1990s, the number of major civil wars has almost tripled in the past decade".(3) Global armed conflicts are also killing more. (4) "The chances of nuclear war are higher than they've been in generations" – a warning the UN disarmament chief recently conveyed to the UN Security Council.(5) With the Global Peace Index 2018 reporting the annual economic cost of violence (war and armed conflict) at a staggering \$14.7 Trillion (USD), people know this isn't a safe or sustainable system.(6)

Countries world-wide lack the capacity to prevent armed conflict and to protect civilians at risk. What they do have is frequently either unavailable to the UN or

inappropriate for UN peace operations. Coalition attempts to protect tend to be too destructive and even counter-productive.

UN peace operations definitely help, but they're now relegated to post-conflict stabilization – putting a lid on a crisis once the fighting slows to allow the start of a peace process. For every operation, the UN faces an arduous process of renting the highly-valued resources of its member states, negotiating around their terms and accepting their conditions. Now it usually takes six-to-twelve months to deploy.

As a result, conflicts tend to escalate and spread, setting back the prospects for development and disarmament for decades. Then they require larger, longer UN operations at far higher costs.

Does it seem odd that countries could put a man on the moon fifty years back, but have yet to equip the UN to meet its primary objective – “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”? No, it's not that governments don't know how to start or what would work.(7) Yet they won't develop such a service until they see a viable plan and feel the pressure of a broad-based, informed constituency.

The UNEPS proposal is one step toward meeting these serious, recurring challenges. Without a dedicated UN Service, national military establishments will remain reluctant to support UN peace operations, military transformation or any shift away from further preparation for more war.

The projected expense and cost-effectiveness

Developing a UNEPS will entail approximately \$3 billion in start-up costs, with annual recurring costs of \$1.5 billion, shared proportionally among 193 Member States. Clearly, there will be additional expenses in deploying a UNEPS, which would require strategic and tactical air-lift for early-in formations, as well as sea-lift for follow-on, heavier assets.(8)

With such additional costs, the advantages must be substantive. A UNEPS should help to prevent the escalation of volatile conflicts; deter groups from violence; and cut the size, length, and frequency of UN operations. Success in just one of those areas would provide a real return on the investment. And there are other positive benefits in this development, which merit further consideration and investment.

Origins of the proposal

There have been numerous precedents outlining the requirements of a UN standing force or UN rapid reaction capacity, usually developed in response to tragic wars and/or genocides.(9) One pivotal contribution arose from Saul Mendlovitz and Robert Johansen, who elaborated on UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie's idea of a UN Legion, with the idea of a permanent force composed of dedicated, individually-recruited personnel rather than drawing on national armed forces.(10)

The proposal for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) largely stemmed from a former Canadian government study on UN rapid deployment.(11)

That study was a response to both the UN Secretary-General's 1992 An Agenda for Peace and the Rwandan genocide. It was initially announced as a year-long, in-depth examination of various innovative proposals, including the creation of a permanent rapid deployment force under UN command. Two members of the core working group were tasked to examine diverse options for a UN standing force.(12) A brief summary of the proposed standing UN Emergency Group was included in the Government report submitted to the UN General Assembly in 1995, with elaboration in a related publication of the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre.(13)

The study was carried out in close consultation with multinational partners, military advisors, and the advice of UN officials. It was followed by a multinational initiative of twenty-eight UN member states in the Friends of UN Rapid Deployment.

Soon after being announced, events transpired to shift the official focus away from a UN standing force toward the more pragmatic, readily-agreeable reforms for UN rapid deployment over the short-mid-, to long-term. A Standing UN Emergency Group was not the preferred option of Canadian or other national military establishments. As such, it was relegated to the long-term concern and denied the attention and support announced.

Yet the study, process, impediments and prospects were deeply scrutinized in a subsequent, independent research effort. The lessons-learned created a better sense of what might work and what definitely wouldn't.(14)

The inspiration for the earlier standing option and ongoing efforts was wider, but often from Sir Brian Urquhart, the study's co-chair. As a pioneer of UN peacekeeping and former UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Urquhart had already stirred a high-level debate with his proposal for a 'UN volunteer military force'.(15)

In 2001, Urquhart emphasized the need for a book elaborating on the Canadian study's option of a UN 'Standing Emergency Group'. A multi-dimensional service, with a multi-functional capacity to help, aligned with projected UN requirements. A civil society constituency was another objective. In response, with support from Don Krause at the Centre for UN Reform Education, Peter Langille published a book in 2002 that refined the concept, case, model, and plans for a UN Emergency Service.(16)

The UNEPS Initiative: a cooperative effort?

The World Federalist Movement-Canada (WFM-C) has been the institutional anchor of this initiative since 2000. It retains a small working group that collaborates with Langille.(17) Their plans are routinely updated to ensure they correspond to the more recent developments in UN peace operations.

A wider initiative for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service followed on from a 2003 forum in Santa Barbara, co-hosted by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Simons Foundation, with three American NGOs assuming a lead role.(18)

This commenced with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF), Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW) and the World Federalist Movement's Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP). At their initial forum, David Krieger suggested that 'peace' be included in the title. There was also wider agreement that Langille's 2002 book be their background book, with unanimous support for the idea of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service.

In 2005, Saul Mendlovitz of GAPW organized an encouraging global conference on UNEPS in Cuenca, Spain, with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation. Drawing on representatives of diverse sectors, there was consensus on the need to improve UN rapid deployment, as well as agreement that the UNEPS concept was appealing, the case was compelling, the model more appropriate and the political prospects appeared better than previous options.(19)

The need for gender-equitable composition in the proposed UNEPS was raised by Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy at a subsequent conference in Vancouver. Robert Johansen of the Kroc Institute also recommended that this service include a justice and corrections capacity as one of the diverse civilian elements. Robert Zuber was introduced as a new fundraiser for UNEPS and GAPW.

In 2006, with financial support of the Ford Foundation, the three NGOs published a book edited by Robert Johansen, A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To

Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.(20) The wider focus and four primary objectives of the UNEPS proposal shifted to the narrower preference of the American NGOs. Yet encouraging efforts were underway.

In 2007, thirty members of Congress supported H-Res 213, “expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that a United Nations Emergency Peace Service capable of intervening in the early stages of a humanitarian crisis could save millions of lives, billions of dollars, and is in the interests of the United States.”(21)

In 2008, another promising conference in Brisbane prompted high-level interest in Japan.(22) For a brief period, Japanese officials offered to host a UNEPS base and to provide related support.

In March of 2008, prior to his first election, Presidential candidate, Barack Obama responded directly to the UNEPS proposal by writing, “I do not support the creation and funding of the United Nations Emergency Peace Service”.(23) American support for the UNEPS proposal diminished.(24) A potentially promising international steering group was disbanded within a year. Two of the three American NGOs already had moved on, leaving GAPW to coordinate limited efforts, with insufficient resources. WFM-C cooperation continued both independently and in occasional partnership with GAPW.

In 2013, the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, where related research had been done in the nineties, hosted a seminar focused on UN rapid deployment and UNEPS. Their report generated doubts and divisions.(25)

Several case studies were published analyzing UNEPS applicability in specific conflicts.(26) Operational plans were developed for training, dovetailing with UN multinational operations, and sequencing deployments and support. The option attracted critical analysis, including regional perspectives.

GAPW affiliates subsequently published two books on UNEPS raising variations on the theme, its applicability to specific regions, even a different model with an American force structure.(27)

In 2014, a substantive International Peace Institute (IPI) review of UN rapid deployment acknowledged that the UN reforms of the past twenty years had been far from sufficient. It concluded that deployments would remain slow and largely incapable of prevention and protection without a UNEPS.(28)

Within the year, WFM-C submitted two detailed reports on the UNEPS option to two UN high-level reviews of peace operations.(29) Another book on UNEPS was

published in 2015 to clarify further requirements and respond to several critiques.(30)

Support

The UNEPS proposal is endorsed by various senior UN officials, former leaders of UN peace operations and an array of experts on peace, security and conflict world-wide.

An encouraging boost to the initiative arose from the 2017 UK Labour Party Manifesto, “For the Many, Not the Few”.(31) It noted, “Labour will commit to effective UN peacekeeping, including support for a UN Emergency Peace Service.”(32) Bilateral discussions with other parties were reported to be encouraging.

Media coverage is positive but sporadic. For example, in 2016 the editorial board of the *Toronto Stars* suggested that the Canadian government support UNEPS.(33) Yet support of the peace and disarmament community was thin until 2017, when a Group of 78 conference was held, ‘Getting to Nuclear Zero: Building Common Security for a Post-MAD World.’ Leading civil society organizations backed the initiative as part of a wider agenda entitled, “A Shift to Sustainable Peace and Common Security”.(34)

In May 2018 at an event in Toronto: “How to Save the World in a Hurry,”(35) a consensus was expressed for a broad platform of 25 proposals on a variety of issues: the “Platform for Survival.” The UNEPS proposal was one of the six proposals addressing the problems of “War & Weapons.”(36)

Impediments

The UNEPS initiative continues to make progress, despite an unfavorable environment.

People world-wide still bear the costs and consequences of a deeply entrenched war system, the unwarranted influence of a global military-industrial complex and, a dysfunctional, impoverished peace system. The UNEPS proposal has not been endorsed by UN Member States or the UN Security Council. Given heightened international tension, no government is in a position to express support, and the UN cannot adopt a contentious proposal without wide agreement from the Member States. After twenty years of austerity and financial cuts to the UN budget, the official preference is limited to pragmatic, incremental reforms of existing arrangements. The manta of ‘do more, with less’ is deeply institutionalized.

Similarly, foundations that support peace and security work have become reluctant to support a challenging proposal without high-profile political leaders or a network of other inclined foundations.

Although millions are mobilizing behind specific campaigns of resistance, civil society and NGO networks have yet to develop inter-sectoral cooperation (and joint campaigns) to address serious global challenges.

The lack of a transnational advocacy network (TAN) remains a problem. With neither government nor foundation support, the research and educational outreach efforts of WFM-C have been limited since 2004 to an all-volunteer effort.

The support of the UK Labour Party prompted challenges from where least expected. The Oxford Research Group (ORG) was at the forefront.(37) Richard Gowan berated the idea and its political proponents.(38) A GAPW affiliate wrote about the 'demise' of the UNEPS initiative, citing the absence of a TAN.(39) ORG's senior fellow, Paul Rogers, proposed a compromise: a UN Standing Force, composed of national militaries, with UK forces in a lead role.(40)

The UNEPS proposal will encounter even more opposition if it acquires traction. Inevitably, national defence establishments and the global military-industrial complex will attempt to keep the old game alive. They control a network of embedded gatekeepers, academics, media and foundations with public-private partnerships. The unwarranted influence of appropriating and disrupting has already strained the UNEPS initiative.

Yet in the words of Stephen Kinloch, "driven back, the idea will, as in the past, ineluctably re-emerge, Phoenix-like, at the most favourable opportunity."(41)

Next Steps

With pivotal elections ahead, progressive policy options, including UNEPS are on the agenda. A political shift may accompany a paradigm shift. Obviously, the prevailing approaches to security, peace, people and the planet are ineffective. An unfavorable environment may shift rapidly. Such a transformation may arise either after a tragic shock or when civil society reaches a tipping point of concern over the multiplying global challenges. Already, there is renewed interest in a more just world, in making the United Nations more effective, in military transformation and economic conversion. Now, the onus is to be prepared.

First, if there is to be a UNEPS, civil society must press political leaders to think big, bold and outward, encouraging multilateral cooperation, innovation and unprecedented shifts.

Second, it's crucial to elevate the all-volunteer UNEPS initiative to a professional campaign. With modest financial support, a UNEPS may be adopted by other progressive parties.

Third, educational outreach must include political outreach, particularly among progressive parties world-wide. And indeed, some leaders are now encouraging a renewal of progressive internationalism.(42) To influence at a high level, this initiative needs a competent briefing team for national capitals, Member States Missions to the UN and the UN Secretariat. Aside from sharing understanding of the idea and addressing concerns, another objective should be to encourage another 'Friends' group of supportive Member States.

Fourth, links should be created between UNEPS support and the NGO communities that address climate change, social justice, and sustainable development. Clearly, there is a need to build bridges and partnerships. The umbrella of sustainable common security encourages such support and solidarity, as well as the substantive shifts urgently needed to address global challenges.(43)

Fifth, as noted in a 2012 publication of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (foundation), "to attract a broad-based constituency of support, the UNEPS initiative needs to expand into a more formal network of civil society organizations, academic institutions and inclined member states. It is time to encourage global centers for UNEPS research and educational outreach."(44)

Sixth, the UNEPS initiative needs a plethora of publications world-wide. As noted, "the UNEPS proposal requires further elaboration in a blueprint. An in-depth study is needed to provide details into the various requirements at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. A review by a panel of independent experts would also be helpful to clarify the potential costs, benefits, options and optimal approach."(45)

A UNEPS is no panacea, but just one step toward a global peace system. With modest support, this option could make a world of difference. As William R. Frye noted, "that which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next."(46)

Endnotes

- 1) World Federalist Movement – Canada, UNEPS Backgrounder, revised January 2017. Available: <https://www.wfmcanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/0217-re-print-0516-uneps-backgrounder8-fnl.pdf>
- 2) Cited in Dominic Dudley, “Where And Why The World Is Getting More Dangerous”, *Forbes*, June 6, 2018. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/06/06/why-the-world-is-getting-more-dangerous/#212535a6dc67>
- 3) Sebastian von Einsiedel, with Louise Bosetti, James Cockayne, Cale Salih and Wilfred Wan, “Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict”, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper, United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, 10 March 2017. https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6156/Civil_war_trends_UPDATED.pdf. These authors also confirm that, “from 2011 to today, there has been a six-fold increase in battle deaths, with 2014 and 2015 being the deadliest years on the battlefield since the end of the Cold War.”
- 4) Richard Norton-Taylor, “Global armed conflicts becoming more deadly, major study finds”, *The Guardian*, May 20, 2015. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/20/armed-conflict-deaths-increase-syria-iraq-afghanistan-yemen>
- 5) Cited in Linda McQuaig, “Prospect of nuclear war highest in decades, yet media ignores”, *Toronto Star*, April 10, 2019. Available: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/star-columnists/2019/04/10/prospect-of-nuclear-war-highest-in-decades-yet-media-ignores.html>
- 6) Global Peace Index 2018, Institute for Economics and Peace. <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf>. As reported, “The economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2017 was \$14.76 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This figure is equivalent to 12.4 per cent of the world’s economic activity (gross world product) or \$1,988 for every person.”
- 7) As early as 1961, officials in the US State Department identified a UN Peace Force as the key to disarmament. In their words, “There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peacekeeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.” See *Freedom from War: The United States program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world*, (United States. Dept. of State. Publication, 1961. Available: <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.a0014375794;view=1up;seq=3>
- 8) The UN Department of Field Support recently conducted a five-year study into a Global Field Support Strategy that demonstrates how logistics, supply and sustainment in operations might be improved to facilitate rapid development of a new UN formation.

9) Among the various contributors to similar ideas were: Trygvie Lie; William R. Frye, the World Veterans Association; Lester B. Pearson; John Diefenbaker; Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn; D.W. Bowett; Lincoln Bloomfield; Boutros Boutros-Ghali; Sir Brian Urquhart; Robert Johansen; Alan Henrikson; the United Nations Association of the United States; Louis D. Huddleston; Captain Edward J. Dennehy, et al; David Cox; Stephen Kinloch-Pichet, and the Governments of the Netherlands and of Canada.

10) See, Robert C Johansen and Saul Mendlovitz, “The Role of the Enforcement of Law in the Establishment of a New International Order: A Proposal for a Transnational Police Force”, *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*, 6, 1980, pp. 307-338.

11) Government of Canada, *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, (Ottawa, 1995).

Available: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/piquant/Langille/Towards+a+Rapid+Reaction+Capability+for+the+United+Nations.pdf>

12) Maxime Faille and Peter Langille were the individuals on the core working group tasked to this section. Major James Hammond provided the critical insight into the organization, planning and structure of a new UN formation. Carleton Hughes assisted with guidance on logistics, support and transport.

13) See Peter Langille, Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes, and Major James Hammond, “A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability” in David Cox and Albert Legault, (eds.) *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities*, (Cornwallis: Pearson Peacekeeping Press, 1995

Available: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/piquant/Langille/A+Preliminary+Blueprint+of+Long-Term+Options+for+Enhancing+a+UN+Rapid+Reaction+Capability.pdf>

14) See Langille, “In Pursuit of Common Security: Initiatives to Enhance Training, Role Specialization and Rapid Deployment for United Nations Peace Operations”, PhD dissertation, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 1999

15) See Brian Urquhart, “For a UN Volunteer Military Force”, *New York Review of Books*, 40, June 10, 1993. <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1993/06/10/for-a-un-volunteer-military-force/>

16) Langille, *Bridging the Commitment: Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment* (Wayne, N.J.: Center for UN Reform Education, August 2002) Available: <http://globalcommonsecurity.info/drpeterlangille/wp-content/uploads/2034/12/HPL-Bridging-the-Commitment...-1.pdf>

17) The WFM-C working group includes Robin Collins, Fergus Watt, Cameron Laing, Peter Langille and the frequent support of Larry Kazdan.

18) For an overview of the founding conference of the UNEPS initiative see, Justine Wang, “A Symposium on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Challenge of Prevention and Enforcement”, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, December 5-6, 2003. <http://www.wagingpeace.org/author/justine-wang/>

19) For a report of this event see, Robert C. Johansen, “Expert Discussion Of The United Nations Emergency Peace Service: The Cuenca Report”, in Johansen (ed.), *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, (with the support of Global Action to Prevent War, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the World Federalist Movement), 2006.

Available: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/UNEPS_PUBLICATION.pdf

20) See, Johansen (ed.), *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service*.

21) U.S. Congress, H.Res.213: 110th Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March, 2007. Available: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/213>

22) The Brisbane conference was organized by Global Action to Prevent War and co-hosted by Steve Kilelea and the Simons Foundation.

23) See, Howard Salter, “Global Cooperation: The Candidates Speak”, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, March 26, 2008. http://fpif.org/global_cooperation_the_candidates_speak/

24) American support diminished further when a number of conference participants stressed that a UNEPS should come from anywhere except America.

25) See Robert Zuber and David Curran, “Peacekeeping and Rapid Reaction: Towards the establishment of cosmopolitan capacities for rapid deployment”, Workshop Report, Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, July 8, 2013.

Available: <https://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/media/socialsciences/peacestudies/Bradford-Write-Up-Sept.pdf>. For a thoughtful response to the Bradford Report see, Robin Collins, “Shouldn’t UNEPS Advocacy be Front and Centre?”, *Global Policy Responses*, November 13, 2013. <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/13/11/2013/gp-responses-shouldn%E2%80%99t-uneps-advocacy-be-front-and-centre>

26) See, Langille, “Preventing Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: One innovation and new global initiative”, Amanda Gryzb, (ed.) *Darfur and the World*, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009). Available: <https://www.wfmcanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Langille-Preventing-Genocide.pdf> Also see, Annie Herro, Wendy Lambourne and David Penklis, “Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: The potential contribution of a UN Emergency Peace Service”, *African Security Review*, Volume 18, Issue 1, (Taylor & Francis) 2009.

Available: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2009.9627514>

27) See Annie Herro, *UN Emergency Peace Service and the Responsibility to Protect*, (Oxford: Routledge Books, 2014). Also see Saul Mendlovitz, Edward Westfall and Stephen Bishop, *Draft Statute for the Formation and Operation of the United Nations Emergency Peace Service for the Prevention of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*, (Newark, Rutgers University, 2013) Available: http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~govdocs/UNEPS_Statute.pdf. For further elaboration of the concerns raised by each see Langille, *Developing a United Nations Emergency Peace*

Service: Meeting Our Responsibilities to Prevent and Protect, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015

28) Langille, “Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment”, International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping Project #8, International Peace Institute, New York, October 2014. Available: <http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/440-improving-united-nations-capacity-for-rapid-deployment.html>

29) See Langille, “Peacekeeping challenges require standing, not just standby, capacities: Time for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service”, A submission of the World Federalist Movement-Canada to the UN High-level Independent Panel reviewing peace operations, March 26, 2015. Available: <http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/HPL%20UNEPS%20for%20H-L-Panel%20March%202018%202015%20fnl.pdf>. A similar report was also submitted to The Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance in May 2015.

30) Langille, “Developing a United Nations Emergency Peace Service”

31) Langille, “UK Labour supports a United Nations Emergency Peace Service”, *Open Democracy*, August 15, 2018. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/howard-peter-langille/uk-labour-supports-united-nations-emergency-peace-service>

32) British Labour Party Manifesto, For the Many, Not the Few: (London, June 2017), p. 120 Available: <http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/Images/manifesto-2017/Labour%20Manifesto%202017.pdf>

33) See “How We Can Keep The Peace”, (editorial, The Star’s View) *Toronto Star*, August 10, 2016. <http://globalcommonsecurity.info/drppeterlangille/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Toronto-Star-on-UNEPS-August-10-2016.pdf>

34) The Group of 78 and Rideau Institute, “A Shift to Sustainable Peace and Common Security”, DEFENCE and FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES: Recommendations by Leading Canadian Civil Society Organizations, Ottawa, (Updated 1 April 2018). <https://group78.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-Update-A-Shift-to-Sustainable-Peace-and-Common-Security.pdf>

35) See Science for Peace, “How to Save the World in a Hurry”, University College, Toronto, May 30 -31, 2018. <https://scienceforpeace.ca/how-to-save-the-world-in-a-hurry/>

36) This wiki is part of the ongoing work that has followed the conference, which has since evolved into “Project Save the World.”

37) Richard Reeve, “UN Peacekeeping and the 2017 Election”, Oxford Research Group, May 17, 2017. Available: <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/un-peacekeeping-and-the-2017-election>

38) See Richard Gowan, “In the U.K. Elections, a Post-Brexit Internationalist Vision Comes Into Focus”, *World Politics Review*, June 5, 2017. In Gowan’s words, “Labour offers to back a ‘U.N. Emergency Peace Service,’ which sounds very much like a standing international army. This is the sort of concept that you only promise to back if you write a manifesto believing you have no

chance of victory.” <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/22350/in-the-u-k-elections-a-post-brex-it-internationalist-vision-comes-into-focus>

39) Annie Herro, “The Quest for a United Nations Standing Army”, Oxford Research Group, March 22, 2018. As Dr. Herro writes, “I have studied the role that a transnational advocacy network has played in contributing to the demise of the most recent proposal for a UN standing force – the UN Emergency Peace Service proposal – yet similar findings could be applied to previous proposals. “<https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/the-quest-for-a-united-nations-standing-army>

40) Paul Rogers, “Sustainable Security: Global Ideas for a Greater Britain”, Oxford Research Group, June 29, 2018. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sustainable-security-global-ideas-for-a-greater-britain>

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